TLDR: This research paper redefines arbitrariness not as a flaw or injustice, but as a fundamental functional mechanism that allows systems (linguistic, legal, social) to operate effectively without revealing their internal rationale. It introduces the “Motivation → Constatability → Contestability” chain, explaining how breaking it through “immotivization” or “Conflict Lateralization” prevents accountability. Formalized using Shannon’s entropy, the paper posits arbitrariness as a neutral operator, capable of enabling both control and unacknowledged care, advocating for a structural ethic of contestability.
A groundbreaking new research paper titled “Opacity as Authority: Arbitrariness and the Preclusion of Contestation” by Naomi OMEONGA wa KAYEMBE, a Researcher in Cognitive Psychology and AI Ethics at Université de Nantes, offers a fresh perspective on a concept often misunderstood: arbitrariness. Diverging from traditional views that equate arbitrariness with injustice or a flaw, this paper redefines it as a fundamental functional mechanism that underpins human systems and interactions.
Historically, arbitrariness has been seen as a sign of symbolic domination and normative instability. Thinkers like Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Social Dominance Theory have explored how societies maintain hierarchies through arbitrary distinctions like race or class, or how power operates invisibly through ingrained norms. While these critical traditions highlight how arbitrariness can lead to inequality and lack of accountability, they often conflate it directly with injustice.
Kayembe’s work builds on Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic concept of “l’arbitraire du signe” (the arbitrariness of the sign). Saussure argued that the connection between a word (signifier) and its meaning (signified) is not based on natural necessity but on social convention. This paper extends this principle beyond language, suggesting that wherever a system produces stable, recognizable effects without clear, inferential justification, arbitrariness is at play. It’s not about randomness or disorder; it’s about order without derivation, where a system functions effectively even if its internal logic is inaccessible or non-existent.
The paper introduces a crucial concept: the “Motivation → Constatability → Contestability” chain. This chain suggests that for an act’s logic to be open to challenge, its motivation must first be exposed (motivation), making it observable (constatability), and only then can it be contested. When this chain is broken, through mechanisms like “immotivization” (deliberately obscuring motives) or “Conflict Lateralization” (diverting conflict into a non-justiciable domain), acts can produce binding effects without revealing their rationale, thus preventing accountability and justice.
In legal systems, for instance, a decision is considered arbitrary if it lacks a clear motivation that makes its internal logic observable and contestable. While some legal acts are discretionary (authorized to bypass motivation), an arbitrary decision evades the very requirements meant to constrain it. This structural opacity, though seemingly illogical, is presented as a deliberate design choice to protect authority from accountability. The paper uses the example of “the blur of the wolf drowned in the fish” to illustrate Conflict Lateralization, where vague language and ambiguous actions mask a clear, often adversarial, intent, making it impossible to confront or contest.
Drawing on Claude Shannon’s entropy model, the paper formalizes arbitrariness as A = H(L∣M), where A is arbitrariness, L is the underlying logic, and M is the exposed motivation. This formula suggests that in an arbitrary context, uncertainty about the logic remains high despite visible motivations, making the act appear explainable yet epistemically opaque. This framework illuminates how justice requires the reduction of this epistemic entropy, allowing motivations to be exposed and challenged.
Crucially, Kayembe argues that arbitrariness is not always nefarious. While it can shield unaccountable harm, it can also carry unclaimed care. The same structural condition that conceals motivation and disables contestation can, in other contexts, enable profound acts of benevolence, protection, or love without offering their own justification. These acts, like a teacher invisibly shielding a student or a colleague protecting another without claiming credit, are also arbitrary in structure but cannot be reduced to domination or violence. They are non-contestable goods, just as others are non-contestable harms.
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Ultimately, the paper calls for a structural ethic of contestability, urging a redesign of communicative, legal, and institutional interactions to ensure actions are epistemically exposable. It challenges us to recognize arbitrariness as a neutral operator, a fundamental aspect of human interaction that can facilitate both control and profound, unacknowledged grace. To delve deeper into this fascinating redefinition of arbitrariness and its implications across various domains, you can read the full research paper here.
